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Abstract
The now-acknowledged vulnerabilities of automatic
speaker verification (ASV) technology to spoofing attacks have
spawned interests to develop so-called spoofing countermea-
sures. By providing common databases, protocols and metrics
for their assessment, the ASVspoof initiative was born to spear-
head research in this area. The first competitive ASVspoof
challenge held in 2015 focused on the assessment of counter-
measures to protect ASV technology from voice conversion
and speech synthesis spoofing attacks. The second challenge
switched focus to the consideration of replay spoofing attacks
and countermeasures. This paper describes Version 2.0 of the
ASVspoof 2017 database which was released to correct data
anomalies detected post-evaluation. The paper contains as-yet
unpublished meta-data which describes recording and playback
devices and acoustic environments. These support the analysis
of replay detection performance and limits. Also described are
new results for the official ASVspoof baseline system which
is based upon a constant Q cesptral coefficient frontend and a
Gaussian mixture model backend. Reported are enhancements
to the baseline system in the form of log-energy coefficients
and cepstral mean and variance normalisation in addition to an
alternative i-vector backend. The best results correspond to a
48% relative reduction in equal error rate when compared to
the original baseline system.
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1, 2] has matured con-
siderably over the last few decades. As an efficient, convenient,
low-cost and reliable solution to person authentication, ASV
technology is finding its way into a growing array of commer-
cial products and services. The research community has also
reacted to concerns regarding the vulnerability of ASV tech-
nology to spoofing [3], also know as presentation attacks [4],
namely attempts by fraudsters to interfere with the normal oper-
ation of an ASV system using specially crafted speech signals.
Vulnerabilities to spoofing are clearly unacceptable; if not ad-
dressed, they stand to dent confidence and jeopardize the com-
mercial exploitation of ASV technology.
So-called spoofing countermeasures, also known as presen-
tation attack detection (PAD) systems, are typically auxiliary
systems which operating along side an ASV system in order to
detect and deflect spoofing attacks. The Automatic Speaker Ver-
ification Spoofing and Countermeasures (ASVspoof) challenge
series was born in order to spearhead their development. Two
such challenges have been held to date. The first focused on
developing countermeasures to defend against converted voice
and synthetic speech spoofing attacks whereas the second fo-
cused on replay attacks. Both challenges were accompanied by
a standard database, protocol and metric meaning that, for the
first time, the performance of competing countermeasure solu-
tions could be meaningfully compared. The databases for both
challenges have been released into the public domain1,2.
Subsequent to the release of the ASVspoof 2017 database,
the organisers became aware of a number of data anomalies.
These were patched in a second version of the database re-
leased in February 20183. This paper describes Version 2 of
the ASVspoof 2017 database in addition to a set of newly re-
leased meta-data, which describes the playback and recording
devices in addition to the different acoustic environments used
in its collection. The paper presents an in-depth analysis of re-
play detection performance using the new meta-data.
Also new to this paper are a number of enhancements to the
original baseline system based upon a constant Q cepstral co-
efficient (CQCC) [5, 6] frontend and Gaussian mixture model
backend. The paper compares results obtained for both Version
1.0 and Version 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 database and both the
original and enhanced baseline systems. Enhancements com-
prise log-energy coefficients, cepstral mean and variance nor-
malisation and an alternative backend i-vector classifier.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the original ASVspoof 2017 database and the differences in-
troduced in Version 2.0. A description of the replay data collec-
tion procedures and meta-data analysis is presented in Section 3.
Baseline enhancements are presented in Section 4. Results and
conclusions are presented in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
1http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/298
2http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/2105
3http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/2301
Table 1: Updated statistics of the ASVspoof 2017 2.0 corpus.
Subset # Spk
# Replay # Replay #Utterances
sessions Config Bona fide Replay
Training 10 6 3 1507 1507
Devel. 8 10 10 760 950
Eval. 24 161 57 1298 12008
Total 42 177 61 3565 14465
2. ASVspoof 2017 database
The ASVspoof 2017 database was collected in order to fos-
ter the development of countermeasures to protect ASV sys-
tems from replay spoofing attacks. This section provides a
brief overview of the data collection process and data partitions.
These are the same as for the original Version 1.0 database
that was used for the 2017 challenge. Also described here are
changes introduced in Version 2.0.
2.1. Data collection
The ASVspoof 2017 corpus is a collection of bona fide and
spoofed utterances. Bona fide utterances are a sub-set of the
RedDots corpus4 [7] collected and released previously in sup-
port of research in text-dependent ASV. The RedDots database
was collected by volunteers using Android smart phones. Utter-
ances correspond to one of the ten different, fixed pass-phrases
(see [8] for more details). Spoofed utterances are the result of
replaying and recording bona fide utterances using a variety of
heterogeneous devices and acoustic environments. The later are
intended to simulate replay spoofing attacks [9, 10]. A total of
57% of replay utterances were collected by four participants of
the EU Horizon 2020-funded OCTAVE project5 (see [8]) while
the remaining 43% were collected by other contributors.
2.2. Data partitions
The ASVspoof 2017 corpus is partitioned into three subsets:
training, development and evaluation. A summary of their
composition is presented in Table 1. Data corresponds to 177
different replay sessions and 61 distinct replay configurations.
The number of replay configurations which comprise the evalu-
ation subset is considerably larger than that which comprise the
training and development subsets.
Meta-data consisting of bona fide/spoofed (non-
replay/replay) ground-truth labels, in addition to speaker
IDs, phrase IDs, and replay configuration details were provided
to ASVspoof 2017 challenge participants for the training and
development subsets only. While corresponding details for
the evaluation set was withheld originally, it has since been
released publicly with Version 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 data.
It supports the deeper analysis of countermeasure performance
(e.g. per acoustic environment, playback device or recording
device).
2.3. Database update
Post-evaluation, the organisers became aware6 of a number of
data anomalies that have potential to influence results and find-
4https://sites.google.com/site/
thereddotsproject/
5https://www.octave-project.eu/
6We kindly acknowledge Ricardo P. V. Violato (CPqD lab, Brazil),
Pavel Korshunov (IDIAP, Switzerland), and Bhusan Chettri (QMUL,
Figure 1: An illustration of the replay spoofing scenario. Figure
adapted from [8].
ings [11]. These mostly involve periods of silence, or zero-
valued samples that are present in the original RedDots data [7].
While being small in number and while being of little conse-
quence to the use of RedDots data for ASV research, these dif-
ferences can impact on the assessment of replay detection per-
formance. The same zero-valued samples are distorted to non-
zero values as a result of playback, propagation in an acous-
tic environment and re-recording and such stark differences
(zero/non-zero values) are easily detected. While the num-
ber of affected trials and duration of zero-valued samples was
not substantial, these anomalies may yet bear influence on re-
play detection results especially, e.g., for approaches which ex-
ploit some form of temporal attention mechanism. Accordingly,
these data anomalies have been corrected through the release of
the ASVspoof 2017 Version 2.0 database. All results presented
in this paper relate to this updated version.
3. Replay meta-data
This section introduces the meta-data that accompanies the re-
lease of ASVspoof 2017 Version 2.0. Described here is the gen-
eral approach to replay simulation and the different playback,
recording devices and acoustic environments used in database
collection. Their different combinations lead to 61 distinct re-
play configurations.
3.1. Replay simulation
Practical replay spoofing attacks are assumed to be imple-
mented according to the diagram illustrated in Fig. 1. Replay
attacks comprise recordings of a bona fide access attempt that
are subsequently replayed or represented to the microphone of
the ASV system.
As described in [8, 12], the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation con-
sidered a worst case scenario where attackers have a digital copy
of bona fide recordings, and specifically, a test utterance of the
target speaker. These are then replayed and recaptured accord-
ing to the scenario illustrated in Fig. 1. Accordingly, the acous-
tic impacts upon an utterance encompass those of a playback
device, a recording device and an acoustic environment through
which sound propagates. A combination of these is referred to
a replay configuration (RC).
With the objective of measuring the limits of replay attack
detection, the ASVspoof 2017 database was designed to contain
a diverse range of replay configurations including conditions
for which the detection of replay attacks should be relatively
straightforward, to those for which detection should be consid-
erably challenging.
UK), and their colleagues for bringing the problem to our attention.
Table 2: Acoustic environments used in the collection of the
ASVspoof 2017 database. Replay recordings made in high
noise conditions (noisier than bona fide speech) are assumed
to present a low threat (green) to ASV; they should be detected
by replay spoofing countermeasures with relative ease Record-
ings made in low noise conditions are assumed to pose a graver
threat (red); they are like to be difficult to detect. Other record-
ings are made in medium noise conditions (yellow).
ID Environment ID Environment
E01 Anechoic room E14 Office 02
E02 Balcony 01 E15 Office 03
E03 Balcony 02 E16 Office 04
E04 Home 07 E17 Office 05
E05 Home 08 E18 Office 06
E06 Cantine E19 Office 07
E07 Home 01 E20 Office 08
E08 Home 02 E21 Office 09
E09 Home 03 E22 Office 10
E10 Home 04 E23 Studio
E11 Home 05 E24 Analog wire 01
E12 Home 06 E25 Analog wire 02
E13 Office 01 E26 Analog wire 03
It is stressed that the categorisations of playback and record-
ing devices represented below reflect qualitative indicators
(e.g. based on device size) rather than scientific or quantita-
tive measures of quality. They should be interpreted accord-
ingly.
3.2. Acoustic environments
The acoustic environment is the physical space in which orig-
inal speech data is replayed and re-recorded. The ASVspoof
2017 database was collected in a total of 26 different environ-
ments, each listed in Table 2 (Environment) and denoted E01-
E26. Variations between them include types and levels of ad-
ditive ambient and convolutive reverberation noise. The level
of noise is assumed to be inversely correlated with the threat
to ASV posed by replay attacks recorded in each environment.
Colour codes in Table 2 serve as an indicator of the replay
threat: low (green), medium (yellow) and high (red).
The two balcony and one cantine conditions are high ambi-
ent noise environments, e.g. traffic noise or background chatter,
where corresponding replay recordings are assumed to pose lit-
tle threat to ASV (high noise should be detected with relative
ease). The eight different home conditions include recordings
made in living rooms and bedrooms characterised by medium
ambient noise levels. The ten office conditions also contain
medium ambient noise, generally produced by air conditioning
systems, but also exhibit reverberation.
There are four low noise conditions. Anechoic room record-
ings exhibit very low additive noise and reverberation whereas
studio recordings contain similarly low levels of ambient noise,
but also a degree of reverberation. Analogue wire conditions
simulate recordings made without physical sound propagation,
but with electrical propagation from a playback device directly
to an ASV system. Replay recordings made in these condition
are assumed to present the stiffest challenge to replay attack de-
tectors.
Table 3: As for Table 2 except for playback devices. Recordings
made with high quality playback devices are assumed to be the
most difficult to detect (red). Those collected with lower quality
devices are assumed to be detected with relative ease (green).
Other devices are assumed to be of medium quality (yellow).
ID Playback device
P01 All-in-one PC speakers
P02 Creative A60 speakers
P03 Genelec 8020C studio monitor
P04 Genelec 8020C studio monitor (2 speakers)
P05 Beyerdynamic DT 770 PRO headphones
P06 Dell laptop internal speakers
P07 Dynaudio BM5A speaker
P08 HP Laptop internal speakers
P09 VIFA M10MD-39-08 speaker
P10 ACER netbook internal speakers
P11 BQ Aquaris M5 smartphone
P12 Logitech low quality speakers
P13 Desktop PC line output
P14 Labtec LCS-1050 speakers
P15 Edirol MA-15D studio monitor
P16 Lenovo Ideatab S6000-H tablet
P17 Logitech S120 multimedia speakers
P18 MacBook pro internal speakers
P19 Altec lansing Orbit USB iML227 portable speaker
P20 Samsung GT-I9100 smartphone
P21 Samsung GT-P6200 tablet
P22 Behringer Truth B2030A studio monitor
P23 Focusrite Scarlett 2i2 audio interface line output
P24 Focusrite Scarlett 2i4 audio interface line output
P25 Genelec 6010A studio monitor
P26 AKG K242HD Headset
3.3. Playback devices
There are 26 playback devices, denoted P01-P26, as listed in Ta-
ble 3. Replay samples collected from consumer-grade portable
replay devices, e.g. smart phones, laptops and tablets equipped
with in-built, generally small loudspeakers, are assumed to be of
lower quality and should be detected with relative ease (green).
Replay samples collected using consumer devices with larger
loudspeakers, e.g. desktop PCs with external loudspeakers, are
assumed to be of medium quality (yellow); they are assumed
to introduce less acoustic distortion than smaller, in-built loud-
speakers. Professional audio equipment such as active studio
monitors and studio headphones are assumed to result in re-
play samples of comparatively high quality; they are assumed
to pose the gravest threat (red). Also included among high qual-
ity devices are audio interfaces or analogue outputs used in the
collection of recordings in analogue wire environments.
3.4. Recording devices
There are 25 recording devices. They are illustrated in Table 4,
denoted R01-R25. Replay samples collected from mobile or
battery powered devices with in-built, miniature microphones,
e.g. smart phones and laptops are assumed to be of lower qual-
ity. Sample collected from such devices are assumed to be de-
tected with ease (green). Samples collected from studio-quality
condenser microphones or hand-held recorders are assumed to
be of higher quality. Such recording are assumed to present a
graver threat (red). Also included among high-quality devices
are audio interfaces or analogue inputs used in the collection of
recordings in analogue wire attacks. Powered desktop devices
such as headsets or webcams, are assume to give recordings of
medium quality (yellow).
Table 4: As for Tables 2 and 3 except for recording devices.
Recordings made with high quality devices are assumed to be
the most difficult to detect (red). Those collected with lower
quality devices are assumed to be detected with relative ease
(green). Other devices are assumed to be of medium quality
(yellow).
ID Recording device
R01 Zoom H6 handy recorder
R02 BQ Aquaris M5 smartphone
R03 Low-quality headset
R04 Nokia Lumia 635 smartphone
R05 Røde NT2 microphone
R06 Røde smartLav+ microphone
R07 Samsung Galaxy S7 smartphone
R08 Desktop PC microphone input
R09 Zoom H6 recorder with Behringer ECM8000 mic.
R10 Zoom H6 recorder with MSH-6 microphone
R11 Zoom H6 recorder. with XY microphone
R12 iPhone 5c smartphone
R13 iPhone 7 plus smartphone
R14 iPhone 4 smartphone
R15 Logitech C920 webcam
R16 miniDSP UMIK-1 microphone
R17 Samsung Galaxy Trend 2 smartphone
R18 Samsung GT-I9100 smartphone
R19 Samsung GT-P6200 tablet
R20 Samsung Trend 2 smartphone
R21 AKG C3000 microphone
R22 SE electronic 2200a microphone
R23 Focusrite Scarlett 2i2 interface line input
R24 Focusrite Scarlett 2i4 interface line input
R25 Zoom HD1 handy recorder
3.5. Replay configurations
The ASVspoof 2017 database contains recordings collected
with diverse replay configurations (RCs). According to the
schematic illustrated in Fig. 1, each RC comprises one playback
device, one acoustic environment and one recording device.
More formally, a RC is defined as a triplet RCc = (Ei, Pj ,Rk)
where c enumerates all unique triplets (i, j, k), i indexing envi-
ronments, j playback devices and k recording devices. Only a
subset (61) of the 26×26×25 = 16, 900 possible RC combina-
tions are represented; not all devices/environments were avail-
able to all the crowd-sourcing data collectors.
In order to aid analysis, the number of distinct RCs re-
ported previously [12] was reduced by the grouping together
of overlapping configurations. Version 2 of the ASVspoof 2017
database contains 61 distinct RCs as indicated in Table 1.
As a precursor to further analysis, the set of replay record-
ings were ranked in terms of the threat they present to ASV.
The reasoning for such analysis is to compare subsequently the
correlation between the supposed threat and spoofing detection
performance. Replay attacks which pose the least threat to ASV
are assumed to be of poor quality (high noise or distortion) as
compared to bona fide speech. It is a reasonable assumption
that these replay attacks should also be detected by a spoof-
ing countermeasure with relative ease. In contrast, high quality
replay recordings are expected to pose a greater threat to ASV
and also be more challenging to detect since they are potentially
more similar to bona fide speech.
A standard Gaussian mixture model with universal back-
ground model (GMM-UBM) ASV system was used for
ranking [13]. It uses a Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient
(MFCC) front-end and a 512-component UBM trained using
RSR2015 [14] and TIMIT7 databases. Phrase-dependent target
speaker models are created from RedDots enrolment data. Un-
der a spoofing-free scenario, this system achieves an equal error
rate (EER) of 1.8% on the evaluation set. The EER for each RC
is computed using all replay segments recorded with the given
RC and the corresponding bona fide counterparts.
Fig. 2 (blue solid profile) shows a sorted rank of the EER
obtained for each of the 57 RCs corresponding to the evalua-
tion set. Without exception, replay attacks collected in all RCs
succeed in spoofing the ASV system to some extent; all EERs
are above those for the spoofing-free scenario. Also evident
from results presented in Fig. 2 is a substantial variation in EER
across different RCs (from 2.0% to 48.0%).
Table 5 shows a list of the same 57 distinct RCs of the eval-
uation set sorted according to the EER ranking in Fig. 2. In
addition to the number of evaluation segments corresponding to
each RC, also illustrated in Table 5 is the number of distinct
playback devices (P), acoustic environments (E) and record-
ing devices (R) used for their collection. Colours reflect the
same qualitative indicators of Tables 2-4. Higher quality replay
attacks (higher-numbered RCs) that are assumed to present a
greater challenge to replay spoofing countermeasures are indi-
cated in red (high quality devices and benign acoustic environ-
ments). Lower quality attacks (lower quality devices and harsh
acoustic environments) that are assumed to be detected with rel-
ative ease are indicated in green.
Noisy acoustic environments appear exclusively to the left
in Table 5. With only one exception, RCs with high quality
playback and recording devices appear to the right. As might
be expected, analogue wire attacks (RCs 55-57) are among the
most harmful to ASV, producing near random decisions (Fig. 2),
and will certainly be among the most difficult to detect. Of
course the general trend is more complex. The three compo-
nents that comprise the RC do not have the same influence on
ASV threat and are unlikely to have the same influence of detec-
tion difficulty, e.g. the quality of a playback or recording device
is of little influence when the acoustic environment is harsh. As
a consequence, strict and consistent trends are difficult to ob-
serve in practice.
4. Baseline countermeasure enhancements
New to the 2017 edition of the ASVspoof evaluation was the
introduction of a baseline countermeasure. It is based upon a
constant Q cepstral coefficient (CQCC) frontend [5, 6] and stan-
dard Gaussian mixture model (GMM) backend classifier. This
section describes the original ASVspoof 2017 baseline config-
uration and enhancements which deliver improved spoofing de-
tection performance for replay attacks, specifically log-energy
coefficients and cepstral mean and variance normalisation, in
addition to an alternative i-vector backend classifier.
4.1. CQCC features
CQCC features are derived using the constant Q transform
(CQT) [15, 16], a perceptually motivated time-frequency anal-
ysis tool and alternative to the short-term Fourier transform
(STFT). Whereas the STFT operates with a fixed spectro-
temporal resolution, that of the CQT is variable, with a higher
frequency resolution at lower frequencies and a higher tempo-
ral resolution at higher frequencies. Just like conventional Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients, CQCC extraction is performed
7https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/ldc93s1
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Figure 2: Impact of different replay configurations (RCs) upon ASV performance (solid blue profile) measured in terms of equal error
rate (%) when a set of zero-effort impostor trials are replaced with replay spoofing trials generated with each RC. Also illustrated is the
detection performance of GMM (blue bars) and i-vector (red bars) spoofing countermeasures (CMs) for the same RCs, also expressed
in terms of equal error rate (%).
Table 5: A list of replay configurations sorted according to the ASV EER ranking in Figure 2. Colour codes reflect the supposed threat
to ASV (Tables 2 to 4). E denotes acoustic environment, P denotes playback device, R denotes recording device. Numbers reflect
distinct replay sessions and number of segments.
ID E P R #seg. ID E P R #seg. ID E P R #seg.
RC01 18 18 12 55 RC20 7 21 14 275 RC39 22 3 4 183
RC02 8 20 19 67 RC21 18 11 12 22 RC40 16 7 6 116
RC03 8 21 25 122 RC22 12 16 11 183 RC41 13 14 9 182
RC04 8 20 25 102 RC23 20 10 15 1138 RC42 11 26 16 153
RC05 8 20 14 114 RC24 17 12 17 179 RC43 6 9 6 84
RC06 8 21 14 108 RC25 9 18 12 42 RC44 13 14 10 179
RC07 8 21 18 120 RC26 17 12 10 184 RC45 10 25 16 346
RC08 2 21 25 98 RC27 6 9 7 96 RC46 18 22 21 181
RC09 7 20 25 244 RC28 21 3 1 240 RC47 23 15 13 342
RC10 2 20 25 82 RC29 18 5 3 454 RC48 19 22 22 1200
RC11 7 20 19 272 RC30 15 19 20 74 RC49 14 3 17 180
RC12 2 20 19 75 RC31 16 7 7 145 RC50 1 15 13 748
RC13 3 8 20 113 RC32 17 12 9 180 RC51 16 7 5 169
RC14 7 21 18 279 RC33 13 14 4 183 RC52 10 26 16 181
RC15 2 21 18 150 RC34 17 12 4 181 RC53 14 3 4 181
RC16 2 21 14 116 RC35 13 14 17 178 RC54 6 9 5 105
RC17 7 21 25 266 RC36 22 4 17 181 RC55 26 24 24 178
RC18 7 20 14 265 RC37 15 19 4 48 RC56 25 13 8 182
RC19 2 20 14 120 RC38 12 17 11 184 RC57 24 23 23 183
with a filterbank, where the Q factor is a measure of the se-
lectivity of each filter, defined as the ratio between the centre
frequency of the filter and its bandwidth.
Cepstral analysis cannot be applied directly to the CQT
since frequency bins are on a different scale to those of the basis
functions of the discrete cosine transform; they are respectively
geometrically and linearly spaced. This problem is solved by
converting geometric space to linear space via re-sampling [6]
before otherwise conventional cepstral analysis is applied.
Designed initially for the detection of voice conversion and
speech synthesis spoofing attacks, the CQCC frontend was ap-
plied to the detection of replay spoofing attacks with only minor
modifications.The CQT is applied with a maximum frequency
of Fmax = FNYQ, where FNYQ is the Nyquist frequency of
8kHz. The minimum frequency is set to Fmin = Fmax/29 '
15Hz (with 9 being the number of octaves). The number of
bins per octave B is set to 96. Re-sampling is applied with a
sampling period of 16 bins in the first octave. Resulting feature
vectors are of dimension 19, excluding the C0 coefficient (cf.
29 coefficients + C0 for the original system). Full details of the
CQCC extraction procedure are reported in [5, 6].
4.2. Log-energy coefficients
While frame-level energy coefficients are used extensively in
a multitude of different speech-related tasks [17, 18, 19], they
have not been applied extensively to spoofing detection problem
in the context of the ASVspoof challenge. Even if the absolute
energy of both bona fide and replayed speech signals may re-
flect more the gain of a recording device, rather than acting as
an strict indicator of spoofing, it is hypothesised here that non-
linear changes to energy dynamics may serve as an indication
of replay. Accordingly, the use of log-energy parameters for
spoofing detection has been explored.
Although the log-energy can be calculated from the time-
domain signal, log-energy coefficients are here calculated in
the CQT domain in order to preserve the time resolution of
CQCC coefficients. Parseval’s theorem states that the total en-
ergy computed in the time domain is equal to the total energy
computed in the frequency domain. In the frequency domain,
the log-energy is defined as the logarithm of the summation of
the spectral components, normalised by the sample size. It can
be calculated according to:
logE(n) = log
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣XCQ(k, n)∣∣∣2 − log(K) (1)
where n is the frame index, k = 1, 2, ...,K is the frequency bin
index and where XCQ(k, n) is the frame-blocked CQT [5, 6].
4.3. Cepstral mean and variance normalisation
Cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN) [20] is an
efficient normalisation technique used to remove nuisance chan-
nel effects which might otherwise degrade the performance of a
variety of different approaches to automatic speech and speaker
recognition. Other researchers have reported the benefit of us-
ing CMVN for spoofing detection, e.g. [21, 22, 23, 24], all of
which relate to replay detection within the scope of ASVspoof
2017.
The application of CMVN to replay spoofing detection
may at first seem counter-intuitive. The playback and record-
ing of speech in different acoustic environments using different
devices is akin to the accumulation of additional channel ef-
fects. CMVN, which aims to attenuate channel effects, may
then be to the detriment of replay detection. This assumption
may only hold, however, if bona fide speech were to be cap-
tured across a common, consistent channel. This is not the
case for the ASVspoof 2017 source data, namely the RedDots
database, which was captured using heterogeneous devices and
channels [7].
Accordingly, CMVN may help to align both bona fide and
replayed speech distributions to a common scale, and hence
force spoofing detection to discriminate between the two ac-
cording to influences other than those caused by channel differ-
ences (which are present in both). The use of CMVN is also
expected to improve the reliability of spoofing detection across
the diverse variation in replay attacks which characterises the
ASVspoof 2017 database.
4.4. Backend classifier
The original baseline system uses a GMM backend classifier.
We have also investigated the performance of an alternative i-
vector approach [18]. Both are described below.
The GMM backend is the same as the original baseline.
It uses models of 512 components. Different models are
learned for bona fide and spoofed speech with an expectation-
maximisation (EM) algorithm with random initialisation. Clas-
sifier scores for a given test utterance are computed as the log-
likelihood ratio Λ(X) = logL(X|θn) − logL(X|θs), where
X is a sequence of CQCC feature vectors, L denotes the likeli-
hood function, and θn and θs represent the GMMs for bona fide
and spoofed speech, respectively.
The alternative i-vector backend [18] uses a universal back-
ground model of 64 components which is trained on the
ASVspoof 2017 training partition. The total variability space
matrix T has 100 factors and is learned using the same data.
The i-vectors are mean normalised, whitened and treated with
within-class covariance normalization (WCCN). The i-vector
training data are averaged before length-normalization. Single
i-vectors are learned for bona fide and spoofed speech classes.
The proposed i-vector backend also uses the same CQCC fron-
tend as the GMM-based classifier.
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Figure 3: Comparison of replay detection performance in terms
of equal error rate (with 95% confidence intervals) for the orig-
inal baseline system for the evaluation set for versions 1.0 and
2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 database.
5. Results and analysis
Several sets of experimental results are reported. The first
shows differences in performance for original baseline systems
for versions 1.0 and 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 database. The
second set of experiments assess improvements to performance
delivered by baseline enhancements. Last, we analyse replay
spoofing detection nuances according to different replay con-
figurations.
5.1. ASVspoof 2017 Version 2.0
Fig. 3 illustrates replay detection performance in terms of EER
for versions 1.0 and 2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 database and for
original baseline systems B01 and B02 [12]. Also included are
95% confidence intervals calculated using the methodology ex-
plained in [25], and using the specific configuration described
in [26]. Differences between systems B01 and B02 lie only in
the use of training (T) or pooled training and development data
(T+D); the systems are otherwise the same. Differences in per-
formance are minor: 25% to 23% EER for B01 and 31% to 30%
for B02. Confidence intervals are highly overlapped, suggesting
that the variations in performance are not significant. While the
same may not hold for alternative approaches to spoofing detec-
tion, these results show that in the case of the particular base-
line system, performance is reasonably stable across the two
database versions.
5.2. Baseline enhancements
Presented here are experiments which assess the benefit of base-
line enhancements presented in Section 4, namely the use of
log-energy, CMVN and the alternative i-vector backend. Re-
sults are presented in Table 6 for different training and testing
configurations involving some combination of the default train-
ing (T), development (D) and evaluation (E) partitions. Such
exhaustive experiments were performed in order to assess the
stability of findings across different training and testing condi-
tions.
Results without CMVN appear to the left of Table 6. Those
with CMVN appear to the right. Results obtained with 19th
order CQCCs and static, delta and acceleration coefficients are
denoted by 19-SDA. Those obtained with appended log-energy
are denoted by 19E-SDA. Without CMVN normalisation, the
use of log-energy decreases performance. Also, the i-vector
backend outperforms the GMM backend.
With CMVN, however, the picture is quite different. Re-
sults to the right of Table 6 show that the use of log-energy
leads to better performance. There is a substantial improvement
Table 6: Replay detection performance in terms of EER for the ASVspoof 2017 Version 2.0 database, several training and testing con-
figurations, different frontend with and without log-energy coefficients and CMVN normalisation and for GMM and i-vector backends.
training on T D T D T+D T D T D T+D
testing on D T E D T E
Feat config. no normalisation CMVN
GMM 19-SDA 11.69 1.36 30.79 25.33 23.97 13.31 8.49 19.74 16.89 15.3319E-SDA 10.37 1.37 34.95 26.3 29.31 9.06 5.64 13.74 14.77 12.24
i-vector 19-SDA 4.43 1.23 17.82 18.81 18.60 11.61 8.74 16.61 15.08 15.6319E-SDA 5.11 1.54 21.47 16.25 21.10 10.52 7.27 14.76 14.37 12.93
Table 7: Replay detection performance in terms of equal error
rate (EER, %) for different qualities of environments and play-
back and recording devices.
Low Medium High
E: acoustic environment 16.68 18.73 21.86
P: playback device 16.64 16.44 18.37
R: recording device 10.80 15.69 17.77
in terms of EER for both GMM and i-vector systems. These
observations support the hypotheses outlined in Sections 4.2
and 4.3. CMVN normalises the log-energy distributions to have
zero-mean and unit-variance, but retains utterance-level energy
dynamics which serve as an indicator of spoofing. With the
application of CMVN, the best performance is achieved using
19E-SDA CQCC features and a GMM backend. Compared to
the previous baseline score of 24.0% the best enhanced baseline
result of 12.2% corresponds to a relative improvement of almost
50%.
Also of interest here is the stability of results and trends
across the different training and testing configurations. Whereas
results without CMVN show substantial variation for different
training configurations, each containing different numbers of
RCs, those with CMVN are more stable. These findings ap-
pear to confirm the hypothesis that CMVN helps to improve
generalisation in spoofing detection.
5.3. Meta-data analysis
Fig. 2 also shows an analysis of performance per RC for the
GMM and i-vector backend classifiers. GMM system uses the
CQCC 19E-SDA configuration with CMVN, while the i-vector
system uses the CQCC 19-SDA configuration. The first inter-
pretation of these results is that there is little correlation between
the supposed difficulty of detection, as indicated by the EER
profile described in Section 3.5, and replay detection perfor-
mance. This finding reflects the combined, complex effects of
the playback device, the acoustic environment and the recording
device. As for CM performance, the GMM system outperforms
the i-vector system for most RCs.
Table 7 illustrates a decomposition of results in terms of
the qualitative indicators displayed in Tables 2 to 4. Results
show the impact of a single element of the RC in terms of
EER for all bona fide trials versus all pooled replay trials cor-
responding to the given qualitative category. While not strictly
true, variation from other elements of the RC are at least some-
what marginalised. These results show more consistent trends.
The impact of the acoustic environment dominates the effect of
the playback and recording devices; the trend for playback de-
vices are inconsistent and show little variation, whereas EERs
for recording device variation are universally lower but show a
consistent trend.
The observations would suggest that, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, ambient and reverberation noise are reliable indicators
of replay spoofing attacks. Replay recordings made in benign
acoustic conditions are more difficult to detect; the highest EER
in Table 7 is for high quality acoustic environments. They also
suggest that the quality of the recording device plays a more sig-
nificant role in the difficulty of replay detection than the qual-
ity of the playback device. These observations would seem to
corroborate the trends shown in Table 7: benign acoustic condi-
tions and high quality recording devices are positioned largely
to the right (red colours).
Needless today, however, coupled with the results illus-
trated in Fig. 2, the physical effects upon a speech signal of
playback and recording are complex. An understanding of how
the variation in replay configurations impacts on different detec-
tion systems, and hence exactly what information these systems
are using, remains an issue requiring further investigation.
6. Conclusions
This paper describes the differences between Versions 1.0 and
2.0 of the ASVspoof 2017 database of bona fide and replay
spoofing attack recordings. New to this paper is (i) a set of
meta-data which describes the diversity of replay configurations
used for database collection and (ii) enhancements to the offi-
cial baseline countermeasure. The latter include the addition
of log-energy coefficients and cepstral mean and variance nor-
malisation (CMVN). Despite being somewhat counter-intuitive
in terms of replay detection, these enhancements bring a rela-
tive reduction to the spoofing detection equal error rate of al-
most 50%.
Meta-data analysis confirms that the effects of replay spoof-
ing are complex and difficult to interpret. Results suggest that
the effect of the acoustic environment is the most influential
upon the performance of replay spoofing detection and show
that that of the playback device is less important. Different
approaches to replay spoofing detection also show substantial
variation in performance across different replay configurations,
suggesting that they are using different cues to detect replay.
These findings show that the problem of replay spoofing de-
tection remains poorly understood and might suggest that future
studies should consider evaluation under controlled conditions.
These may allow the influence of each component in a replay
attack to be isolated and studied more reliably. Findings from
such studies may then help to design more reliable replay spoof-
ing countermeasures. The findings from the study reported in
this paper will feed into the roadmap for future ASVspoof eval-
uations.
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